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ABSTRACT
We present a formal model of opinion diffusion and formation
which combines notions from social network analysis together with
concepts and techniques from judgment aggregation and merging.
The model allows us to study the propagation of individual opin-
ions, represented in the form of yes/no answers to a set of multiple
binary issues, in a multiagent system linked by an influence net-
work. The process is iterative with discrete time. We are interested
in characterizing properties of the network structure which guaran-
tee convergence of the iterative process for every initial configura-
tion of the agents’ opinions, and in developing tractable algorithms
for computing the set of opinions at convergence.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Studies of social influence in social sciences and in social psy-
chology have emphasized the role of interpersonal processes in how
people construe and form their perceptions, judgments, and impres-
sions (e.g., [1, 11, 34]). According to this literature, social influ-
ence consists in forming an opinion on the basis of the opinions
expressed by the other individuals in the society. Social influence
is one of the basic mechanisms driving the diffusion of opinions in
human societies: certain agents influence other agents in the soci-
ety to acquire a certain view who, in turn, influence other agents in
the society to acquire the same view, and so on.
The present paper intends to provide a formal model of opinion
diffusion and formation in social networks which combines con-
cepts from the theory of social networks [22] together with con-
cepts and techniques from judgment aggregation [32] and merging
[27]. With the term ‘opinion’ we refer to the public expression of
a view by an agent about some issue(s). In this sense, the term
opinion does not refer to an agent’s mental attitude but rather to the
expression of a mental attitude of the agent.
Our model of opinion diffusion and formation can be summa-
rized as follows. We start from a given population of agents. Each
agent in the population is identified with a number of opinions on
a given set of binary issues. The issues about which agents have to
form their judgments may be dependent: an agent’s opinion about
a given issue may depend on the agent’s opinion about other issues.
Dependence between issues is expressed via an integrity constraint
which is nothing but a formula of propositional logic in our context.
Consider for instance the following example, inspired from the
literature on computational social choice [4]. Four agents, Bob,
Ann, Jesse and Mary, need to take a decision on whether to build a
swimming pool (S) or a tennis court (T ) in the common area of the
residence where they live. In other words, they have to form opin-
ions about whether S and/or T have to be case. Issues S and T are
dependent insofar as the common area of the residence is so small
that a swimming pool and a tennis court cannot be built at the same
time. Specifically, the following integrity constraint is assumed:
¬(T ∧ S). Let us suppose that, at the beginning of the interaction
process (time t0), both Ann and Bob have a positive opinion about
S and a negative opinion about T . That is, both Ann and Bob
express their preference for the construction of a swimming pool
rather than for a tennis court. On the contrary, both Mary and Jesse
have a negative opinion about S and a positive opinion about T .
That is, both Mary and Jesse express their preferences for a tennis
court rather than a swimming pool.
Moreover, each agent i identifies a set of neighbours that con-
tains all agents in the population who can influence i’s opinions or,
conversely, all agents in the population who are trusted by agent
i. This induces an influence (viz. trust) network and an edge from
agent j to agent i indicates that j can influence i’s opinions (viz.
i trusts agent j). For example, suppose that Ann trusts both Mary
and Jesse while she does not trust Bob: only Mary and Jesse can
influence her opinions. At the opposite Bob does not trust anybody
apart from Ann.
At each stage in the interaction process, the agents in the popula-
tion aggregate the current opinions of their neighbours to form their
new opinions. Different aggregation criteria can be used such as
unanimity (e.g., change your current opinion if all your neighbours
have a different opinion) or majority (e.g., change your current
opinion if the majority of your neighbours have a different opin-
ion). For example, if the aggregation criterion used by the agents
in the population is either unanimity or majority then, at time t1,
Ann will start to have a negative opinion about S as she is influ-
enced by Jesse and Mary’s opinions at time t0 about this issue. At
time t2 Ann will maintain her opinion, while Bob will change his
opinion and start to have a negative opinion about S by taking into
account Ann’s negative opinion about S at time t1.
Through a formal formal model of opinion diffusion and forma-
tion, our aim is to: (i) study the properties of the network structure
which guarantee convergence of the iterative process for every ini-
tial configuration of individual views, (ii) exhibit the set of opinions
at convergence, and (iii) provide algorithms for computing this re-
sult. Examples of properties of the network structure are acyclicity
of the underlying graph or whether the cycles in the underlying
graph are disjoint or not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related
work. Section 3 presents the basic definitions of our model of opin-
ion diffusion in networks. Section 4 presents general results about
convergence of opinions in specific classes of networks. These re-
sults are independent from the aggregation procedure used by the
agents to form new opinions on the basis of those of their neigh-
bours in the network. Sections 5 and 6 focus on on two variants
of our model in which agents are assumed to use specific aggrega-
tion procedures, namely the unanimity rule and the majority rule.
Section 7 concludes by discussing perspectives for future research.
2. RELATED WORK
Our work stems from two research agendas: the development
of formal models of influencing power, mainly developed in the
game-theoretic literature, and the study of opinion diffusion and
formation based on influence mechanisms, mainly developed in the
literature on social sciences and social network analysis.
Influencing power.
Formal models of influencing power developed in social sciences
are focused on measuring how much an agent in a social network
can influence the opinions of the other agents in the network. A
formal model of influencing power was introduced in the social sci-
ences more than fifty years ago by Isbell [21] and, more recently,
starting from the work of Hoede and de Bakker [19], a series of
papers developed a first formal model of influencing power in sit-
uations of binary decisions [14, 15]. In this model, a set of indi-
viduals make a yes/no decision on a single issue, and an influence
function determines the dynamics from a profile of individual opin-
ions x ∈ {0, 1}n to the next state. The key concept is the followers
function, which specifies for each coalition of individuals the set of
individuals that follow their (unanimous) decision.
Opinion diffusion.
There have been several attempts in the literature to build models
of opinion diffusion in social networks that are based on influence
mechanisms. The aim of these models is to study the evolution
of the opinion distribution and, in particular, the conditions under
which the opinions of the agents in a society tend to converge to
consensus in the long run. Two families of models have been stud-
ied, namely discrete models and continuous models.
Discrete models assume that agents can only have binary (two-
state) opinions such as yes-no, for-against. Some of these models
are concerned with the problem of studying the conditions under
which the opinion of a minority of agents tends to maintain itself
(e.g., [30, 23]). Granovetter [17] and Schelling [36] were among
the first to propose discrete models of opinion diffusion in the area
of social sciences. These are called thresholds models, as they as-
sume that each agent in the population is identified with a given
numerical value which characterizes the number or proportion of
neighbours who must have a certain opinion before the agent adopts
it. A generalisation of thresholds models, called the linear thresh-
old model, has been extensively used in recent years in studying
diffusion models (see, e.g., [25, 24]). In the linear threshold model
each edge in the social network has a non-negative weight attached
which characterizes the strength of the influence relation. Another
example of model of opinion diffusion in networks is the so called
voter model. In this model the propagation of opinions follows
a random process in which at each step an individual on the net-
work chooses the opinion of a random neighbour [5, 20]. The la-
bel propagation algorithm used in the related setting of community
detection and formation, is a similar model where every individ-
ual follows the most approved opinion in her neighbourhood [35].
This latter setting coincides with the framework studied in this pa-
per with the plurality rule with random tie-breaking as individual
aggregation function.
Continuous models assume that agents may have continuous
opinions about a given issue, indeed a numerical value. For ex-
ample, in DeGroot’s model [6] (also known as the Lehrer-Wagner
model [31]) agents update their opinions depending on the weight
they attach to the others’ opinions, where this weight can be viewed
as a rough approximation of a notion of trust. In particular, in De-
Groot’s model it is assumed that every agent i attaches to the opin-
ion of another agent j a given weight ki,j such that the higher the
value of ki,j , the higher the influence of j’s opinion on i’s opinion.
In Chatterjee and Seneta’s model [3] it is assumed that the weight
an agent attaches to her own opinions can vary over time, while in
DeGroot’s model this weight as well as the weights an agent at-
taches to the others’ opinions are kept constant over time. In the
bounded confidence (BC) model [28, 18, 8], the agents have con-
tinuous opinions and the agents actually influence each other only
if the distance between their opinions is below a threshold. The BC
model can be seen as a non-linear version of previous continuous
opinion models [12, 13]. A variant of the BC model is the Rela-
tive Agreement Model (RA) [7] in which, during interactions, the
agents are assumed to influence both each other’s uncertainties and
each other’s opinions. Related models (e.g., [2]) consider vectors
of binary traits rather than continuous opinions as a better approxi-
mation of the diffusion of culture in a social network.
The present paper.
The present paper combines the preceding two lines of research
on influencing power and opinion diffusion in social networks. As
in existing models of influencing power, our work aims at under-
standing the basic influence mechanisms which are responsible for
the dynamics of opinions in a social network. As in existing mod-
els of opinion diffusion, we are interested in the convergence of the
iterated opinion propagation process. However, we do not focus
on the characterization of situations converging at consensus. We
also consider situations in which the opinions of the agents in the
network converge without being necessarily aligned.
Hereafter, we commit to the discrete model perspective on opin-
ions, as we want to consider their qualitative dimension. However,
out setting generalizes existing models of opinion diffusion under
two important aspects. First, we do not limit opinions to two values
but rather to a list of binary values; opinion are expressed on a set
of possibly correlated issues. We represent the interplay between
issues by means of a constraint expressed in propositional logic
grounding our perspective on opinion diffusion on concepts and
techniques issued from judgment aggregation and merging. Sec-
ond, the proposed model does not commit to any specific aggrega-
tion criterion by means of which an agent aggregates the opinions
of her neighbours in the network. This is the main innovation and
key difference with the existing models of opinion diffusion dis-
cussed above.
3. BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this section we present our model for the propagation of indi-
viduals’ opinions on an influence network. We represent individual
opinions as yes/no answers to a set of possibly correlated questions,
a setting that has been shown to be general enough to model a va-
riety of individual expressions such as preferences, judgments and
approval sets [16]. We model the influence network as a directed
graph, and we define an iterative propagation process with discrete
time, with individuals updating their opinions from those of their
neighbours by making use of an aggregation procedure.
3.1 Individual opinions and influence net-
work
Let I = {p1, . . . , pm} be a finite set of questions or issues.
Each individual in a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} expresses an opin-
ion Bi ∈ {0, 1}
I in the form of a yes/no evaluation over each
issue in I. We often call Bi a ballot, borrowing the terminology
from voting theory. Observe that in defining opinions we do not
tolerate uncertainty. Hence Bi should not be considered as agent
i’s belief but rather as the public expression of i’s view about the
issues in I. Examples of opinions are expressions of value judg-
ments (i.e., whether a state of affairs should be considered good or
bad), expressions of preferences (i.e., whether object a is preferred
to object b) or desires (i.e., whether a state of affairs is desirable
or not) and, finally, expressions of choices (i.e., whether an action
should be performed or not).
Let LPS be the language of propositional logic over atoms
{p1, . . . , pm}. An integrity constraint IC is any formula in LPS,
and it is used to define a set of feasible individual opinions consist-
ing of its satisfying assignments X = Mod(IC) ⊆ {0, 1}I . For
instance, if we are interested in modelling opinions as expressions
of individual preferences over a set of itemsA = {a, b, c . . . }, then
we may use a set of issues IA = {pab | a, b ∈ A}, and an integrity
constraint that enforces the required properties of a preference re-
lation. For instance, reflexivity can be represented by the formula∧
a∈A paa, forcing each individual to accept issue paa; transitivity
corresponds to the conjunction of formulas pab ∧ pbc → pac for
all distinct a, b, c ∈ A. We assume that each individual opinion is
feasible, i.e., Bi ∈ X for all i ∈ N . Thus, we consider IC as a
common rationality assumption shared by all individuals.
A generalisation of the present model would allow for different
agents in the population to have different integrity constraints. That
is, according to this generalisation, every agent i ∈ N has her
own integrity constraint ICi ∈ LPS and agent i’s set of feasible
opinions is defined as Xi = Mod(ICi) ⊆ {0, 1}
I . Feasibility of
ballots is obtained by imposing that Bi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ N . To
keep the model simpler, here we prefer to assume that the integrity
constraint is the same for all agents. It is worth noting that most
results presented in the paper easily extend to this general case.
Individuals are connected by an influence network represented in
the form of a directed graph E ⊆ N × N , with the interpretation
that (i, j) ∈ E if and only if agent j is influenced by agent i. We
also refer to E as the influence graph and to individuals in N as
the nodes of the graph. Note that the influence network is directed,
hence (j, i) ∈ E represents the fact that j influences i.
3.2 The iterative process
Define the influence set Inf (i) = {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ E} of
agent i to be the set of influencers of i. We model opinion diffusion
as a discrete time process: at time t ∈ N, t 6= 0 each individual
updates her opinion by aggregating the opinion of all agents in her
influence set at time t − 1. This process is guided by an aggre-
gation procedure Fi for each individual i, that computes how an
agent changes her opinions starting from those of her influencers.
Given an integrity constraint IC that defines a set of feasible opin-
ions X , a (collectively rational) aggregation procedure is a class of
functions F : Xn → X for each n ∈ N. Notable examples are the
majority rule, that accepts an issue if and only if there is a majority
of individuals accepting it (see Section 6 for a formal definition), or
distance-based procedures that merge the opinion of the influencers
using a suitable minimisation process.
Let therefore Bti ∈ X be the opinion of agent i at time t, and
B
t = (Bt1, . . . , B
t
n) the associated profile. The iterative process is
defined as follows:
B
t
i =
{
Bt−1i if Inf (i) = ∅
Fi(B
t−1
Inf (i)) otherwise
where Bt−1
Inf (i) is profile B
t−1 restricted to the set Inf (i) of in-
fluencers of agent i. We call this process propositional opinion
diffusion (POD). If Fi = F for all i ∈ N , i.e., all individuals use
the same aggregation procedure, we call the process uniform-POD.
EXAMPLE 1. Let us go back to a variant of the example dis-
cussed in the introduction. Ann, Bob and Jesse need to take a de-
cision on two mutually exclusive actions S and T , corresponding
to building a swimming pool or a tennis court in the common area
of the residence where they live. The set of possible opinions is
thus represented as the set of models of the propositional formula
IC = ¬(S ∧ T ), i.e., X = Mod(IC) = {01, 10, 00}, representing
the three possibilities of performing only the first action, only the
second action, or neither actions. Let us consider a more complex
influence network connecting the three individuals in question. Bob
is influenced by both Ann and Jesse, and also takes into consider-
ation his current opinion (he is a compromising agent). Jesse is
influenced by Ann, and does not take into consideration her cur-
rent opinion (she is a conformist agent). Finally, Ann is influenced
by herself only (she is stubborn). The influence network is depicted
in Figure 1.
Bob Ann
Jesse
Figure 1: A simple influence network.
Let us start from a profile of initial opinions B0 = (01, 00, 10),
corresponding respectively to Ann, Bob, and Jesse’s opinion. As-
sume moreover that each agent update their opinions using the ma-
jority rule, i.e., they change their opinion if and only if all influ-
encers agree. At the first step, Bob does not change his mind since
Ann and Jesse disagree, Ann is only influenced by herself, hence
her opinion remain stable, and Jesse moves to 01 since she is in-
fluenced by Ann. Hence, B1 = (01, 00, 01). At the second step
Ann and Jesse do not update their opinions, but Bob changes to 01
since a majority of its influencers agree on 01 – all influencers in
this particular case. Thus, the opinion diffusion process converges
to a consensus state B∗ = (01, 01, 01), corresponding to building
a tennis court and not building a swimming pool.
In this paper we are interested in characterising classes of net-
works on which convergence of POD is guaranteed. To do so, we
first formally define the notion of convergence:
DEFINITION 1. Given a class of graphs E ⊆ 2E
2
, we say that
POD converges on E if for all graphs E ∈ E and for all profiles of
initial opinions B0 ∈ XN there is a convergence time t¯ ∈ N such
that Bt = B t¯ for all t ≥ t¯.
Our notion of convergence is centered on the notion of graph
property, e.g., acyclic or tree-shaped graphs, rather than on the set
of initial individual opinions, on which we do not assume to have
any prior knowledge.
3.3 Aggregation procedures
There is a vast number of aggregation procedures that have been
introduced in the literature on social choice theory and on judgment
aggregation in particular. Classic examples are the unanimous rule
seen in Example 1, the majority rule which will be studied in Sec-
tion 6, and distance-based rules, which select the closest opinion to
that of the influencers making use of a suitable notion of distance.
In this paper the role of an aggregation procedure is that of mod-
eling the opinion update process brought about by the influence
structure. Therefore, we discard situations of negative influence,
in which individuals change their opinion to the opposite opinion
of their influencers. Similar situations can be avoided by assuming
some axiomatic properties on the aggregation procedure. A first
property is the following:
Ballot-Monotonicity: for all profiles B = (B1, . . . , Bn), if
F (B) = B∗ then for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have that
F (B−i, B
∗) = B∗.
Where B−i consists of profile B without ballot Bi. Ballot-
monotonicity implies that the result of aggregation in a given pro-
file should not change if one of the agents gives additional support
to the winning opinion. This is a very weak form of monotonicity
and is satisfied by most known aggregation procedures. Observe
that, when there is only one single agent, any ballot-monotonic ag-
gregation rule boils down to a simple copying of the influencer’s
opinion, i.e., F (B) = B for any B ∈ X when n = 1.
Another property that we shall consider is that of unanimity:
Unanimity: for all profiles B = (B1, . . . , Bn), if Bi = B for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n then F (B) = B.
A unanimous aggregation procedure copies the opinion of the col-
lectivity if there is no disagreement.
In both definitions the quantification over profiles was left delib-
erately open, and has to be intended to be restricted to the domain
of the aggregation procedure F . This ambiguity should not cre-
ate problems in the technical results that follow, where aggregation
procedures are defined on all admissible ballots and for as many
input ballots as there are influencers in the network.
Aggregation procedures may or may not satisfy a given set of
axiomatic properties. For example, both the unanimity rule used
in Example 1 and the majority rule sketched in the introduction
satisfy both ballot-monotonicity and unanimity. Research in social
choice theory has often focused on characterising unfeasible sets
of axiomatic properties [32]. In the sequel we will explicitely men-
tion when any such property is being assumed on the aggregation
procedures defining the opinion diffusion process.
4. THE GENERAL MODEL
In this section we prove convergence of POD on different classes
of graphs and we provide an algorithm for computing the opinions
at convergence for the class of directed acyclic networks with loops.
We will not focus on particular aggregation procedures to be used
by individuals, but we will rather constrain their choice with the
use of axiomatic properties.
4.1 Convergence results
Let us first introduce some useful notation. A directed acyclic
graph (DAG) is a directed graph that does not contain cycles. A
DAG with loops is a DAG where we allow only for cycles of size
one, i.e., edges of the type (i, i). Loops are very important in
an opinion diffusion process, since they indicate whether an agent
takes her current opinion into consideration when updating. Let
a source of a graph E be a node such that Inf (i) ⊆ {i}, and let
diam(E) be the diameter of a graphE, i.e., the length of the longest
path between a source and any of the nodes.
THEOREM 2. If Fi satisfies ballot-monotonicity for all i ∈ N ,
then POD converges on the class of DAG with loops after at most
diam(E) + 1 number of steps.
PROOF. Let i ∈ N be a node and d(i) be the maximal distance
from i to a source node, i.e., the length of the longest simple path
from i to any of the sources. As the influence graph E is acyclic,
d(i) is finite and is bounded by the diameter of E. We now prove
by induction on d(i) that POD converges for a node i after exactly
d(i) steps.
Let d(i) = 0, i.e., i is a source. If Inf (i) = ∅, then the POD
procedure simply copies i’s opinion, hence Bti = B
0
i for all t ≥ 1.
If Inf (i) = {i}, then, as observed in Section 3, by a consequence
of ballot-monotonicity we obtain that B1i = Fi(B
0
i ) = B
0
i . The
same holds for all t ≥ 1.
Assume now that all nodes j such that d(j) = k have converged
to a stable opinion at step k + 1. Let i be an individual such that
d(i) = k+1. Observe first that, since the graph is acyclic, Inf (i)\
{i} contains only nodes that are at distance at most k from a source,
hence by inductive hypothesis we can assume they have reached a
stable opinion B∗j . If i 6∈ Inf (i) then B
t
i = Fi(B
∗
Inf (i)) for all
t ≥ k + 2, since all opinions of i’s influencers are stable from
step k + 1 onwards, hence showing convergence of Bti from t =
k+2. If instead i ∈ Inf (i), then Bk+2i = Fi(B
∗
Inf (i)\{i}, B
k+1
i ),
and Bk+3i = Fi(B
∗
Inf (i)\{i}, B
k+2
i ) = B
k+2
i , the last equality
obtained by ballot-monotonicity. Hence Bti = B
k+2
i for all t ≥
k+ 2, obtaining the desired bound on the number of steps to reach
convergence.
The assumption of ballot-monotonicity in Theorem 2, albeit very
weak, is necessary. As a counterexample, consider an anti-majority
rule on a single issue, which dictates to each individual to take the
opposite opinion to that of the majority of her influencers. In this
case, any source with Inf (i) = {i} will constantly change opinion
from 0 to 1, undermining the convergence on the whole network.
The assumption of acyclicity is also crucial to obtain conver-
gence, as shown by the following theorem. Let a circle be a graph
composed of a single cycle, and let us work under uniformity as-
sumption, i.e., Fi = F for all i ∈ N .
THEOREM 3. If F is not ballot-monotonic, then uniform-POD
does not converge on the class of all graphs.
PROOF SKETCH. We show that, if F is not ballot-monotonic,
then we can construct an influence network that is a circle Cm =
{(1, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (m − 1, 1)} of length m, and an initial vector
of opinions B0 on which POD does not converge. Recall that the
action of F on a circle describes how to update one’s own opinion
from the opinion of a single influencer, i.e., how to obtain Btj from
Bt−1j−1. The aggregator has therefore the form F : X → X . Since
X is finite and F is not ballot-monotonic, which in this case is
equivalent to say that there exists a B such that F (B) 6= B, we can
construct a cycle of opinions B1 . . . Bk such that F (Bi) = Bi+1
for all i ≤ k − 1 and F (Bk) = B1. Now take any cycle Cm of
length m 6= k, and profile of initial opinions B0 = (B1, . . . , B1).
POD does not converge as the cycle of individual opinions will
continue rotating in the circle of individuals.
Another class of networks on which we can show convergence
for uniform-POD is that of complete graphs, i.e., graphs E = N ×
N where every individual is connected to each other.
THEOREM 4. If F is unanimous, then uniform-POD converges
on the class of complete graphs.
PROOF. In a complete graph we have that Inf (i) = N for all
i ∈ N . Hence, B1i = F (B
0) for all i ∈ N , making the opinion
profile at step one unanimous, i.e., B1 = (F (B0), . . . , F (B0)).
Therefore, by assumption of unanimity of F , we obtain that Bti =
F (B1) = F (B0) for all t > 1.
Theorems 3 and 4 show an interesting dicothomy in the conver-
gence of uniform-POD: on the one hand, if individuals form a sin-
gle cycle we lose the convergence result of Theorem 2, while on the
other hand convergence is guaranteed if individuals form all possi-
ble influence links composing a complete graph. In Section 6 we
are able to obtain a convergence result between these two extremes,
albeit by focusing on the majority rule as the common aggregation
procedure.
4.2 Computing opinion diffusion in a DAG
The proof of Theorem 2 suggests a polynomial algorithm for
computing the result of POD at convergence, provided that the
opinion update process defined by the individual aggregation pro-
cedures can also be performed in polynomial time. Our algo-
rithm, together with the observation that checking acyclicity of a
graph can be done in polynomial time, shows that POD on directed
acyclic graphs with loops is a tractable problem.
Input: A DAG with loops E over N = {1, . . . , n}, an initial
opinion vector B0 = (B01 , . . . , B
0
n)
Output: Final opinion vector B∗ = (B∗1 , . . . , B
∗
n)
for i ∈ N do
curr_opinion_i = B0i ;
end
stable = {sources of E};
while stable6= N do
for i 6∈ stable do
curr_opinion_i=POD _update_i;
stable=stable ∪ next(stable);
end
end
return (curr_opinion_1, · · · , curr_opinion_n);
Algorithm 1: POD computation on DAG with loops.
With the help of Algorithm 1, we are now in a position to show
that the opinions at convergence of POD can be computed in poly-
nomial time as long as the aggregation procedure is also polyno-
mial. Recall that an aggregation procedure is polynomial to com-
pute if the result of F (B) can be computed in polynomial time on
all profiles.
COROLLARY 5. If E is acyclic and F is ballot-monotonic and
polynomial to compute then the opinion profile B∗ at convergence
of POD can be computed in polynomial time.
PROOF. By the proof of Theorem 2 we know that POD con-
verges in a number of steps equal to the maximal distance be-
tween a source and any node (i.e., the diameter of the graph) plus
one additional step. Algorithm 1 can hence be used for comput-
ing the result of POD . The algorithm uses a subprocedure called
“POD_update_i” for computing the updated opinion of an individ-
ual using aggregation procedure Fi, a subprocedure which by as-
sumption can be performed in polynomial time. The subprocedure
“next” simply computes the nodes at distance one from a given set
of nodes (not considering loops), and guarantees termination of the
while loop in a number of steps equal the diameter of the graph,
plus an additional step for loops.
Algorithm 1 propagates individual opinions from the sources of
the network to the furthest nodes, making use of subprocedure
POD_update_i at most k × |N | times, where k is the diameter
of E (the worst case being an influence graph that is a transitive,
complete and reflexive ordering of the individuals). It is easy to see
that if E is a DAG, hence E does not contain loops, the number of
calls to POD_update_i is bounded by |N |, i.e., each Fi needs to be
computed only once.
Most interesting aggregation procedures known from the liter-
ature are unfortunately super-polynomial to compute [26, 10, 29].
Algorithm 1 anyway shows that the number of times that the aggre-
gation function needs to be computed is bounded by the diameter
of the influence graph and by the number of individuals forming
an instance of POD. Hence, convergence is tractable under specific
conditions on the graph and the aggregation procedures.
5. THE UNANIMOUS CASE
In this section, we show a simple convergence result that iden-
tifies sufficient conditions for convergence of unanimous opinion
diffusion over possibly cyclic networks.
Consider the case of individuals that change their opinions only
if influencers all share the same opinion, as was the case in the in-
troductory example. Call U-POD the propositional diffusion model
where each Fi is the unanimity rule. More precisely:
B
t
i =

Bt−1i if Inf (i) = ∅
B if Bj = B for all j ∈ Inf (i)
Bt−1i otherwise
Even if unanimous update may seem restrictive, it is anyway an
interesting and tractable example of opinion diffusion. In the fol-
lowing, we consider that all agents exclude themselves from their
influence sets, hence restricting to graph without loops. Two cycles
are called vertex-disjoint if they have no internal vertex in common.
THEOREM 6. LetE be an influence network without loops such
that all cycles contained inE are vertex-disjoint and, for each cycle
inE, there exists i ∈ N belonging to the cycle such that |Inf (i)| >
2. Then U-POD converges on E after at most |N | steps.
PROOF. Let us first show convergence for the case of a net-
work containing a single cycle and satisfying the property in the
statement. Let therefore C = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk} be the nodes in
the single cycle, such that (mj ,mj+1) ∈ E for all j ≤ k and
(mk,m1) ∈ E, and let mi be a node on the cycle with at least one
influencer that is external to the cycle, i.e., |Inf (mi)| ≥ 2 (recall
that E has no loops). Let us make the assumption that all external
influencers of nodes in the circle have reached a stable opinion (cf.
Theorem 2). We distinguish two cases. First, if the influencers of
mi that are external to the cycle have non-unanimous opinions then
mi will never change its opinion, since we are using the unanimity
rule. If instead all its external influencers agree on a given opinion
B, and B0mi 6= B, then mi can update its opinion only in case
mi−1 also agrees with B at a certain point in time. Observe how-
ever that once Btmi = B then B
t′
mi
= B for all t′ > t, that is, once
mi updates to the unanimous opinion of its external influencers
then it is not anymore possible to change it. We have shown that
the existence of an individual with at least one external influencer
on the cycle is sufficient to guarantee the convergence of her own
individual opinion. This fact implies the convergence of all other
individual opinions on the cycle, since the stability of mi’s opinion
does not allow for cyclic behaviour in the opinion dynamic. Note
that, in the worst case, we need to update the individual opinions
on the cycle a number of steps equal to the size of C.
Let us now consider the general case. Let C1, . . . , Cs be a clus-
tering of the network E such that each Cj is either one of the
vertex-disjoint cycles in E or a single vertex. Assume moreover
that the order is consistent with the graph, i.e., if (ij , ik) ∈ E and
ij ∈ Cj and ik ∈ Ck for distinct j and k, then j < k. Obtain-
ing such an ordering is possible since all cycles are vertex-disjoint.
By induction on this ordering we now prove that all nodes reach
convergence. First, observe that C1 must be a source node, hence
it converges in one step as in the proof of Theorem 2. Otherwise,
C1 would be a circle that has no external influencer, contradicting
the hypothesis that at least one node in the circle has more than two
influencers. Assume now that all nodes until Ck reach convergence
after |C1|+ · · ·+ |Ck| steps, and consider Ck+1. Observe that all
influencers of nodes in Ck+1 belong to C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck, since all
cycles need to be disjoint, and hence by inductive hypothesis have
reached convergence. Therefore, either Ck+1 is a single node, and
then we can apply U-POD once to obtain convergence, or Ck+1
is a cycle with stable influencers, in which case we know by the
first part of the proof that it converges after 2|Ck+1| steps. Since
|C1|+ · · ·+ |Cs| = |N | we obtain the desired statement.
Theorem 6 shows that if cycles in the influence network are
vertex-disjoint, then a minimal condition suffices to ensure con-
vergence of unanimous POD . The result at convergence can then
be computed in polynomial time by simply computing opinion dif-
fusion a sufficient number of steps, i.e., a number of steps equal to
the number of nodes in the network.
6. THE MAJORITARIAN CASE
In this section we study the diffusion of opinions over a network
where each individual follows the opinion of the majority of her
influencers (possibly including herself). We are able to strenghten
Theorem 2 obtaining convergence on a larger class of graphs, and
we provide a closed form to compute the set of individual opinions
at convergence from the initial opinions of the network sources.
6.1 Convergence results
On multi-issue domains the majority rule does not always re-
sult in admissible outcomes, i.e., it is possible that all individuals
have admissible opinions while the result of the majority is not ad-
missible; this is a well known result in judgment aggregation and
merging. To avoid similar problems, in this paper we restrict to
the case of a single issue. Our results generalise immediately to all
cases in which the majority rule constitutes a collectively rational
aggregator; that is, to all domains defined by integrity constraints
that are equivalent to a formula in 2-CNF [16].
Let p be a single issue. In this case, individuals have initial opin-
ions Bi ∈ {0, 1}, forming an initial profile B
0 ∈ {0, 1}n. Given a
profile B, let n1B be the number of individuals that accept the issue
in profile B and n0B the number of those that reject it. Formally,
the majority rule maj (B) = 1 if n1B > n
0
B , maj (B) = 0 if
n0B > n
1
B and maj (B) = {0, 1} in case n
1
B = n
0
B . Technically,
the above-defined majority rule constitutes a non-resolute aggre-
gation procedure, since it can output a set of admissible opinions
rather than always a single one. This explains the following setting
which takes care of possible ties:
B
t
i =

Bt−1i if Inf (i) = ∅
Bt−1i if |maj (B
t−1
Inf (i))| = 2
maj (Bt−1
Inf (i)) otherwise
Under these assumptions, an agent changes her opinion at time t
only if she observes a strict majority of opposite opinions at time
t − 1 among her influencers. We call this process majoritarian
propositional opinion diffusion (maj-POD).
We are interested in strenghtening Theorem 2, obtaining conver-
gence on a larger class of networks. The following theorem shows
that convergence can be guaranteed even if the graph contains cy-
cles:
THEOREM 7. Let E be an influence network such that all cy-
cles contained in E are vertex-disjoint and, if a node i belongs to a
cycle, then |Inf (i)| is of even cardinality, then maj-POD converges
on E after at most |N | steps.
PROOF. Let us first show that if E contains a single cycle and
satisfies the properties in the statement, then maj-POD converges.
Let therefore C = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk} be the nodes in the single
cycle, such that (mj ,mj+1) ∈ E for all j ≤ k and (mk,m1) ∈ E.
Let ExtInf (mj) = Inf (mj) \ (mj−1) be the set of influencers of
mj different than mj−1, and possibly including herself. Consider
any node mj ∈ C at time 1. Since Inf (mj) has even cardinality,
we can distinguish two cases:
(a) there is strong majority among ExtInf (mj) either support-
ing or against the issue, i.e., either n1
B1
≥ n0
B1
+ 2 or
n0
Bt
≥ n1
Bt
+ 2. In this case the opinion of the internal
influencer mj−1 is irrelevant: at step 1 agent mj will update
her opinion to that of the majority of ExtInf (mj) and her
opinion will not change for the rest of the process.
(b) there is a simple majority among external influencers for ei-
ther accepting or rejecting the issue, i.e., there is one more
individual supporting than rejecting the issue or viceversa.
We distinguish two sub-cases:
(b1) if mj−1 agrees with the majority of external influ-
encers, then mj updates her opinion accordingly and
will not change it anymore. To see this, observe that
after step 1 the opinion of mj−1 becomes irrelevant,
since in the worst case mj will observe a tie in the in-
fluencers opinions and will not change her view.
(b2) if mj−1 does not agree with the majority, mj does not
change her opinion since she observes a tie.
Hence, we have shown that once a node on the cycle updates her
opinion to that of the majority of her sources, it is then not possible
to revert it. Therefore, in at most k steps the opinions on the cycle
stabilise, where k is the size of the cycle. The worst case is the
influence network depicted in Figure 2, where in exactly k steps
the systems converges to consensus on 1.
The general case of vertex-disjoint cycles can be treated in an
analogous way to the proof of Theorem 6.
11
02
...0k−1
0k
11
12
1k−1
1k
Figure 2: Maj-POD converges in k steps.
Theorem 7 shows convergence of maj-POD when all cycles
present in the graph are vertex-disjoints, and when each node that
belongs to a graph has an even number of influencers, i.e., it has
at least one external influencer and an odd number of them if there
are more. The graph in Figure 2 shows an example where each ver-
tex on the graph has exactly two influencers, one internal and one
external. Theorem 7 cannot be strengthened easily. Figure 3 shows
a network and an initial opinion vector where maj-POD does not
converge. To see this, observe that at each step any of the two in-
ternal nodes observes a tie in the opinions of their external sources,
and will hence copy the opinion of the other individual in the cycle.
0 1
0
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1
Figure 3: Maj-POD does not converge.
Theorem 7 guarantees that the result of maj-POD at convergence
can be computed in polynomial time:
COROLLARY 8. The result of maj-POD at convergence B∗ can
be computed in time O(n2m), where n = |N | and m = |E|.
PROOF. Theorem 7 guarantees convergence of maj-POD in
|N | = n steps. Hence, we can compute the opinion profile B∗
at convergence in an iterative fashion: first we compute B2i for all
i ∈ N using the majority update, then all B3i for i ∈ N , until we
reach Bni in a total of n
2 steps. Each step is a simple application of
the majority rule among at most |E| edges, resulting in a bound of
O(n2m).
6.2 From dynamic to static computation of
opinion diffusion
In this section we focus on a decomposition feature specific to
the majority rule, in order to provide faster algorithms for the com-
putation of maj-POD . To do so, we express opinions at conver-
gence as a sort of linear combination of the initial opinions of the
network sources, defining in passing a novel measure of the (indi-
rect) influence of a source agent on the rest of the graph.
We first need some additional notation. Let E be the network
relating the individuals. A path onE is a sequence of distinct nodes
i1, . . . , im such that (ij , ij+1) ∈ E for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k− 1. Given a
path g = i1, . . . , im, we say that k ∈ g if there exists a j such that
an ij = k. We denote with P (i1, i2) the set of paths connecting
node i1 to node i2. Let deg(i) = |Inf (i)| be the indegree of a node
i, i.e. the number of her influencers. Finally, let us indicate with
C−1(i) the set of ancestors of a node i, i.e., all nodes that have a
path connecting them to i.
In what follows we restrict to networks that do not allow for ties
between the influencers of any given node, guaranteeing the exis-
tence of a strict majority at any step of opinion update. Hence, we
call a network resolute if deg(i) is either zero or it is an odd number
for every i ∈ N . We can finally state the following characterisation
of individuals’ opinions at convergence of maj-POD in terms of the
initial opinions of the sources:
THEOREM 9. LetE be a resolute DAG, and let B∗ be the opin-
ion profile at convergence of maj-POD . The following holds:
B
∗
i = maj (α(s1, i)B
0
s1 , . . . , α(sm, i)B
0
sm) (1)
Where s1, . . . , sm are the sources of E, αB stands for α copies of
B, and α(sj , i) is computed as follows:
α(sj , i) =
∑
g∈P (sj ,i)
∏
k 6∈g
k∈C−1(i)
d̂eg(k) (2)
where d̂eg(k) = 1 if k is a source node, and d̂eg(k) = deg(k)
otherwise, α(sj , i) = 0 if sj is not connected to i, and we assume
the empty product to be equal to 1. Finally, we set B∗i = B
0
i if
Inf (i) = ∅, i.e., if i is already a source node.
PROOF. Since the network E is resolute, the majority rule will
never result in a tie. Hence, the definition of Maj-POD simplifies
to B∗i = maj(B
∗
Inf (i)). Observe that if k is an odd integer, then:
maj (B0,maj (B1, . . . , Bk)) = maj (kB0, B1, . . . , Bk) (3)
where kB0 stands for k copies of ballot B0. To see this, observe
that the majority rule gives equal weights to each of the ballots
that are being aggregated, and if one is itself a majority of k other
ballots then the weights should be redistributed to reflect this num-
ber. Let us therefore go back to the computation of B∗i . For each
j ∈ Inf (i) that is not a source, B∗j is also defined in terms of
the majority rule as B∗j = maj (B
∗
Inf (j)). Now, since the net-
work is resolute, each node has an odd number of influencers and
hence we can iterate equation (3) from i to the sources of E ob-
taining that B∗i = maj (α(s1, i)B
∗
s1 , . . . , α(sm, i)B
∗
sm). Every
source that is not connected to i will not appear in the formulation,
hence α(sj , i) = 0. Since sources do not update their opinions,
i.e., B∗sj = B
0
sj
, we obtain equation (1).
Let us now show how to compute the multiplicative coefficients
α(sj , i). First, consider the case of E being a polytree, i.e., a di-
rected graph such that its undirected version is a tree. IfE is a poly-
tree then there is a unique path relating any two nodes on the graph,
i.e., |P (i1, i2)| = 1 for any i1, i2 ∈ N . Therefore, equation (2)
boils down to α(sj , i) =
∏
k 6∈g deg(k) where g is the unique path
relating the source sj to node i. Consider now i’s opinion at con-
vergence B∗i = maj (B
∗
Inf (i)). We can expand further this expres-
sion by observing that each Bj for j ∈ Inf (j) that is not a source
can be written as the result of the majority over its influencers, and
then simplify this expression using (3). Observe moreover that the
multiplicative coefficient in (3) are equal to the indegrees deg(j)
of influencers j ∈ Inf (i). Let us now use once more the assump-
tion that E is a polytree. Since every source connected to node i
reaches i from one and only one influencer, say j¯, the overall mul-
tiplicative coefficient at step one is equal to
∏
j∈Inf (i),j 6=j¯ d̂eg(j).
We can now repeat the same process one level further, and so on
until we reach the sources, obtaining the expression (2) for the case
of polytrees.
Let us now consider the general case of an acyclic resolute net-
work without loops. Under these assumptions there are several
paths that connect a given source sj to node i, hence any source
sj is connected to i through one or several direct influencers of i.
Hence, each source sj may occur more than once in the unravel-
ing of B∗i obtained using (3). However, the multiplicative coeffi-
cient of each path is computed as in the previous part of the proof.
Since the majority rule is anonymous we can permute the aggre-
gated ballots in order to sum these multiplicative coefficients, each
one obtained following a different path that connects a source to i,
obtaining equation (2) for the general case.
We are now able to refine the bound given by Corollary 8 on the
computation of opinions at convergence for maj-POD :
COROLLARY 10. If E is a resolute DAG, then B∗i can be com-
puted in time O(k(n +m)), where k is the number of sources of
E, n = |N | and m = |E|.
PROOF SKETCH. First, the indegree of each node in the graph
can be computed in time O(n+m). Sources can be identified from
the indegree table – recall that the graph is a DAG – and all simple
paths that connects a source s with node i can be computed with
a depth-first search in time O(n +m). It is then sufficient to use
equation (2) to compute the multiplicative coefficient α(s, i) and
use equation (1) to compute the result of maj-POD at convergence
for agent i.
When loops are present, or when the network is not resolute,
the situation is more complex and neither a reduction in the style
of Theorem 9 nor a faster computation may be possible. Observe
however that loops can be neglected by making use of a suitable
notion of graph transformation. More precisely, let E be a graph
with loops. Given i ∈ N and time t ∈ N, we can construct a
graph E′ without loops, which contains a copy of E and is such
that Bti = B
t
i′ . The graph transformation works as follows: the
opinion of a node i with a loop at time t is equivalent to that of a
node i′ without loops that has exactly the same influencers with the
same opinions, but has also a copy of itself at time t−1 as external
influencer. We can then substitute the loop around i with a copy of
all parent nodes of i (possibly containing loops) and an extra copy
of itself (containing a loop) at time t − 1. This defines a recursive
procedure that is guaranteed to end after at most t steps, and that
can be applied to eliminate each loop in the network. Hence, if we
are able to prove convergence for graphs without loops, then the
same is guaranteed for graphs with loops. However, the size of the
equivalent graph without loops may be prohibitively large.
The multiplicative coefficient α(s, i) introduced in Theorem 9
can be considered as a precise measure of the (indirect) influence
of a source s on a node i. As observed in Section 2, influence
measures have already been introduced in the literature on formal
models of influence. In particular, Grabisch and Rusinovska [15]
focus on situations of binary choice such as those considered in this
section. However, without the guarantee of convergence, their mea-
sure of influence focuses on one step changes in individual opin-
ions, counting how often a given individual changes her opinion
according to the unanimous opinion of a given coalition. Explor-
ing potential connections between these two measures of influence
constitutes a prominent direction for future work.
Theorem 9 opens several other interesting problems concern-
ing the characterisation and the computation of opinions at conver-
gence of maj-POD . For instance, we may be interested in comput-
ing the ratio of sources needed to obtain consensus on a given net-
work structure, or study strategic reasoning aspects such as bribery
and control to enforce specific patterns of opinions to form at con-
vergence or at a given point in time.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a formal model of opinion propaga-
tion on networks, based on the notion of aggregation procedure.
Our work differs from classical models of opinion diffusion and
formation as we commit to a fully qualitative view of opinions and
we consider each individual opinion formation process as a (possi-
bly different) aggregation procedure.
Our results show that individuals’ opinions reach a convergence
state on directed acyclic graphs, even when self loops are allowed.
For two specific cases, namely that of the unanimity rule and the
majority rule, we presented sufficient conditions to guarantee con-
vergence on general networks, provided that there is no interplay
among the influence cycles that may be present. For all cases un-
der question we devised tractable algorithms for the computation of
opinions at convergence. We also showed that in the specific case
of majoritarian opinion diffusion it is possible to reduce the com-
putation of the opinions at convergence to a suitable combination
of the initial opinions of the sources.
Amongst other directions, in future work we aim to relax two of
the main hypothesis of this paper: the completeness of individual
opinions and the tractability of aggregation procedures:
Uncertain opinions Each Bi could be viewed as a subset of the
models of IC. In this case, opinion formation is closer to
merging and all classical merging procedures could be rel-
evant to our context [27]. Numerous issues then needs to
be considered. First, distance-based procedures [26] will
become central for defining the impact of influence. Sec-
ond, as aggregation becomes more complex, tractability may
become an issue. The computational complexity of belief
merging is no longer polynomial and closed forms such as
the one shown in Theorem 9 may be hard to obtain. A first
step in this direction may use recently proposed approxima-
tions of distance-based procedures in binary aggregation [9].
Opinion aggregator Several other aggregation procedures may be
considered in order to take into account more sophisticated
phenomena. Fist, in the current paper we have assumed only
one network for building an opinion on multiple issues. An
immediate extension is to consider multiple influence graphs:
one for each issue or subset of issues. Once we consider at
the same time correlated issues and different influence net-
works for different issues, new aggregation procedures need
to be defined and novel convergence results be studied. Sec-
ond, our influence network is qualitative and thus does not
handle hierarchy between influencers: a selfish agent may
give at first a high importance to her own opinion. This hier-
archy can be viewed as bridge between qualitative and quan-
titative models: If an agent has little influence on a second
one, then her opinion should also be weighted in the aggre-
gation procedure. Recent work on trust-based belief change
[33] can provide a promising starting point in this direction:
it shows how an agent revises her epistemic state with re-
spect to some public announcement and weight of trust, the
strength of trust propagating to the strength of belief.
In conclusion, in this paper we combined research in social net-
work analysis and judgment aggregation and merging, obtaining
a number of tractable models for opinion dynamics. Our initial
results explored a variety of problems posed by the model, and
opened several directions for both empirical research and theoreti-
cal exploration of the problem of opinion diffusion on networks.
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